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The patient is responsible for bills for medical treatment and it is inappropriate
for the attorney to agree to be personally responsible for those bills. However,
the physician may request the attorney to secure the patient's agreement that
outstanding medical bills be satisfied from any settlement, judgment or insurance
proceeds. If such an agreement is obtained, the attorney is personally responsible
to see that it is carried out and is liable to the physician for failure to do so.
It is the duty of an attorney to see that a physician is promptly compensated for
his time devoted to the proceeding. It is preferable for both the attorney and the
physician to reach an agreement in advance concerning the amount of fees and
expenses for time devoted to preparation or testimony. Neither the attorney nor
the physician should enter into any agreement in which the physician's compen-
sation is contingent upon the outcome of a case.
Section Five
Medicolegal Committee
The Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of the State of Maryland and the Mary-
land State and City of Baltimore Bar Assocations maintain a standing joint
committee on interprofessional relationships. The committee is known as the
Medicolegal Committee. Its purpose is to promote a close and more harmonious
relationship between the two professions. The committee membership is com-
posed of twelve attorneys and twelve physicians.
The Committee will consider all matters concerning interprofessional relation-
ships between the two professions, including, but not limited to, the following:
1. Promotion and perpetuation of harmony between the professions.
2. Achieving a fuller understanding of mutual problems.
3. Promotion of educational programs of interest to both professions.
4. Publish guidelines regarding fees for record reproduction, preparation of
medical reports, and time spent in preparation for and the giving of depositions
and trial testimony.
5. Consideration of disputes arising from interprofessional relationships
including violations of the above Code.
6. Referral of legal or ethical violations, including violations of this code, to the
Commission on Medical Discipline or the Attorney Grievance Commission in
appropriate situations.
In dealing with problems which arise between individuals, physicians, and
attorneys, the Committee will recommend a course of action based upon the
principles in the Medicolegal Code. Matters already in litigation between an
attorney and a physician will not be considered by the Committee.
Section Six
General Provisions
Nothing contained in this statement of principles is intended to be inconsistent
with provisions of law or rules of ethical conduct for attorneys or physicians, or to
permit attorneys to gain undue advantage in furtherance of a medical/legal claim
against a physician.
Approvals:
1. Bar Association of Baltimore City, Executive Committee, May 11, 1981.
2. Maryland State Bar Association, Board of Governors, June 11, 1981.





Diethylstelbestrol (DES) is a syn-
thetic hormone that was initially
manufactured to help menopausal
women. After continued research,
DES was found to be an aid for prob-
lem pregnancies and especially effec-
tive in the prevention of miscarriages.
Prior to 1952, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approved the
use of DES on an experimental basis
for problem pregnancies. The FDA
required that a notice of potential
danger be given with each DES
product. By 1954, more than 267
companies marketed DES "On an un-
limited basis rather than as an exper-
imental drug, and they failed to warn
of its potential danger." Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 163 Cal.Rptr. 132, 134
607 P.2d 924, 926 (1980).
In 1971, the connection was made
between DES ingestion during preg-
nancy and gynecological cancer, in
the female offspring. Subsequently,
the FDA banned the use of DES for
problem pregnancies.
What remains of the unbridled dis-
regard for the FDA requirements is
diagnoses of young women with var-
ious forms of gynecological cancer,
whose mothers have no recollection
of the precise manufacturer respon-
sible for the DES taken. In most of the
suits against the DES manufacturers,
the crucial problem is that of identify-
ing the manufacturer of the ingested
pill.
The Defendants in the DES suits
have all been DES manufacturers.
Some have been able to exclude them-
selves by proving they did not market
their product in the vicinity or at the
time the drug was taken.
Because courts are primarily con-
cerned with having the proper parties
before the bench, many cases have
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been dismissed due to the Plaintiff's
inability to identify the exact Defen-
dant. Other courts have permitted
the Plaintiffs to go beyond the identi-
fication problem by employing at least
one of three theories of liability: con-
cert of action, alternative liability, and
enterprise liability.
Below is an attempt to distinguish
the three forms of joint liability most
often used in cases where the precise
Defendant is not identifiable.
A. CONCERT OF ACTION
The most quoted way of describing
concert of action is: "All coming to do
an unlawful act, and of one party. The
act of one is the act of all of the same
party being present." The threshhold
aspect to this theory is that in most
concert of action cases an express or
tacit agreement is found to have
existed among the Defendants. This
is precisely why all Defendants are
liable for damages.
In cases where the precise Defen-
dant cannot be ascertained, concert of
action is a particularly advantageous
form of liability. The Plaintiffs' argu-
ment would be that the first manu-
facturers pooled their information
when applying for NDAs in order to
"rush into production without ade-
quate testing." If they knew, or should
have known, that this created the risk
of an unreasonably dangerous pro-
duct, their original cooperative be-
havior was tortious. It can be argued
that the later FDA approval of DES
for use in pregnancy depended on this
earlier joint submission of clinical
data. Parallel, imitative practices
among many of the manufacturers of
DES, as well as actual agreement in
some cases, resulted in uniform cau-
tions, lists of contraindications and
dosage schedules, and reliance on the
same dubious scientific articles in
promotional materials .... Thus each
individual Plaintiff's injuries resulted
from the tortious, concerted activities
of all DES manufacturers .... Since
each DES manufacturer is a'substan-
tial factor' causing each Plaintiff's
injuries, he is jointly and severally
liable regardless of whether he manu-
factured the particular drug which the
Plaintiff's mother ingested." Sheiner,
DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise
Liability, 46 F ORDHAM L. REV. 963,980
(1978), hereinafter referred to as
Sheiner.
This theory, termed "Conscious
Parallelism," was used in Bichler v. Eli
Lilly& Co., 79 A.D. 2d 317,436 N.Y.S.
2d 625 (1981), where the Plaintiff
recovered $500,000.00. Although rec-
ognizing that such a recovery under
the concert theory was an expansion
of the doctrine, the Bichler Court held
that product liability law must "con-
tinue to adopt to the exigencies of
rapidly developing technologies." 24
ATLA Rep. 178 (1981).
The Michigan Court of Appeals in,
Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59
289 N.W.2d 20 (1980), held that stat-
ing the Defendants had acted in con-
cert was sufficient to survive a Motion
for Summary Judgment. "Liability is
imposed on all because all have joined
in breaching their duty of care to
Plaintiff, and he was injured as a
result of that breach."
However, the Supreme Court of
California in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,
163 Cal.Rptr. 132,607 P.2d 924 (1980)
declined to apply the concert doctrine
holding that to do so would be an
unwarranted expansion of the doc-
trine. Even though the Sindell court
would not permit recovery based on
concert, it did render a verdict for
Plaintiff (reversed judgment for De-
fendants) by extending another the-
ory of liability.
One last hurdle to overcome in
using the concert theory is that this
doctrine is traditionally employed to
deter hazardous group behavior. The
Courts that have expanded the doc-
trine to permit recovery in DES cases
have done so to cure the Plaintiff's
inability to identify the manufacturer
who produced the DES ingested. This
expanded use shifts the burden of
causation to Defendants, making it
their burden to exculpate themselves.
It could be argued that the burden of
causation is satisfied by the Plaintiff
once joint liability (via concert theory)
has been proved. Therefore, the only
shifting to Defendant is from inculpa-
tion to exculpation. This argument
should be used when a court is reluc-
tant to shift the burden of causation.
To reiterate the above, a concert
of action is the parallel behavior of the
manufacturers that permits the use
of the doctrine and the crucial ele-
ment placed on Plaintiff is proving the
tacit agreement of the Defendants.
To overcome this a Plaintiff must
prove that all Defendants shared data
used to prepare the DES and any
other evidence that would show
parallel behavior.
B. ALTERNATIVE LIABILITY
Where concert of action has a pri-
mary purpose of deterring anti-social
behavior, alternative liability impos-
ing joint and several liability, has a
purpose of relaxing the Plaintiff's
burden of proof as to causation. Plus,
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there is no tacit agreement require-
ment. The best explanation of alter-
native liability is in Sheiner, at 985.
"This theory has been applied to cases
where all Defendants are at fault in
that all behaved tortiously, but only
one unidentifiable Defendant caused
Plaintiff's injury. Since the Defend-
ants acted independently, there is no
concert of action. In order to solve the
problem of causation, once all tort-
feasors are joined, the courts have
shifted the burden of proof of cause-
in-fact to Defendants. Where Defen-
dants cannot meet this burden and
absolve themselves, joint and several
liability results."
The leading case in this area is
Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80,199 P.2d
1 (1948). The Plaintiff in Summers was
injured by one of two hunters, both
having fired simultaneously. Because
it would have been impossible for the
Plaintiff to discover which one was
responsible for the injury, the Cali-
fornia Court held that "where Defen-
dants are all wrongdoers and their









which the innocent Plaintiff cannot
identify the cause of his injury, the
fairness dictates that he should not be
required to do so or go remediless."
Sheiner, at 985.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS 433B (2) & (3) (1965) states:
(2) Where the tortious conduct
of two or more actors has com-
bined to bring about harm to the
Plaintiff, and one or more of the
actors seeks to limit his liability
on the grounds that the harm is
capable of apportionment among
them, the burden of proof as to
the apportionment is upon each
such actor.
(3) Where the conduct of two or
more actors is tortious, and it is
proved that harm has been caused
to the Plaintiff by only one of
them, but there is uncertainty as
to which one has caused it, the
burden is upon each such actor
to prove that he has not caused
the harm.
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liability theory in DES cases shift the
burden of causation to the Defendants
to limit their liability. The courts
often hold the drug manufacturers
liable only for the percentage of DES
marketed at a given period, the period
being the one in which the Plaintiff's
mother ingested DES. The purpose
behind the Summers holding and the
Restatement is to allow the innocent
Plaintiff a remedy when at least one
of the Defendants is culpable.
The Summers court denied recovery
to the Plaintiffs in Sindell, based on a
strict Summers rule. The Court distin-
guishing the DES cases from Summers
said as to Summers, "There, all the
parties who were or could have been
responsible for the harm to the Plain-
tiff were joined as Defendants. Here,
by contrast, there are approximately
200 drug companies which made DES,
any of which might have manufac-
tured the injury-producing drug."
Sindell, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139, 607 P.2d
at 931. The problem for the Plaintiff,
otherwise stated, is that due to the
number of manufacturers, it would
be unfair to make all Defendants lia-
ble for the harm when obviously only
one, and perhaps even none of the
Defendants before a court, was
responsible.
In spite of these policy reasons, the
court fashioned a way for the Plaintiff
to recover. "We hold it to be reasona-
ble in the present context to measure
the likelihood that any of the Defen-
dants supplied the product which
allegedly injured Plaintiff by the per-
centage which the DES sold by each
of them for the purpose of preventing
miscarriage bears to the entire pro-
duction of the drug sold by all for that
purpose .... Each Defendant will be
held liable for the proportion of the
judgment represented by its share of
that market unless it demonstrates
that it could not have made the pro-
duct which caused Plaintiff's injuries."
163 Cal. Rptr. at 145,607 P.2d at 937.
A different approach to alternative
liability can be found in Erlich v. Abbott
Laboratories, 24 ATLA Rep. 226 (1981).
The Pennsylvania Court denied De-
fendant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment and held that the Plaintiff could




liability. Four elements were needed
to permit the application of RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 433 B(3)
(1965).
(1) Plaintiff, through no fault of
her own, cannot identify the
manufacturer.
(2) Those manufacturers who
produed substantially all of the
defective product in the relevant
time and geographic area have
been joined as Defendants.
(3) All Defendants engaged in
wrongful conduct, here the mar-
keting of a dangerous drug with-
out adequate warnings.
(4) All of the products of De-
fendants were identical and
shared the same defective quali-
ties, precluding the liability of all
members of an industry for the
poor quality of a single manu-
facturer.
The Court in Abel v. Eli Lilly, 94
Mich. App 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1980)
permitted the Plaintiffs to recover
based on alternative liability even
though it cited an accord with Sindell.
As to burdens placed on the parties,
the Abel court stated, "Plaintiffs must
establish that they suffered a certain
amount of damages at the hands of
Defendants, all of whom are tort-
feasors. Should Plaintiffs succeed in
establishing that Defendants are alter-
natively liable for this amount of
damages, Defendants are left to ap-
portion the damages among them-
selves. Each Defendant is free to
present proof, absolving itself from
liability as to any particular Plaintiff
or as to all Plaintiffs. Defendants are
also free to implead any third party
whom they believe liable for all or
part of the damages." 94 Mich. App.
59, -, 289 N.W.2d 20, 26.
Alternative liability was not per-
mitted in Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical
Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406
A.2d 185 (1979), basically because the
Plaintiff could identify the manufac-
turer. But the court commented on
the theory as to the element of shift-
ing the burden of exculpation to the
Defendants by stating, "Such a radi-
cal shifting of burdens from a Plain-
tiff to a Defendant is not undertaken
lightly, but necessitated only by strong
policy which favors recovery by inno-
cently injured Plaintiffs who could
not otherwise recover because they
cannot identify the source of injur-
ies." Lyons, 170 N.J. Super. 183, 192-
193, 406 A.2d 185, 190.
The basic pitfall in applying alter-
native liability and assessing damages
by market share is that of making
sure the proper Defendants are before
the court. Ultimately, it is a convinc-
ing argument that the policy reasons
of permitting the innocent Plaintiff to
recover outweigh the "radical shift-
ing" of the burden to the Defendants.
C. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
Enterprise liability is a hybrid the-
ory combining both concert of action
and alternative liability. It seems to
have its roots (at least for the modern
trend of cases) in, Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours, 345 F.Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1972). Hall involved a number of
Plaintiffs suing many explosives manu-
facturers for injuries resulting from
blasting caps. The U.S. District Court
in New York held, "If Plaintiffs can
establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the injury-causing caps
were the product of some unknown
one of the named Defendants, that
each named Defendant breached a
duty of care owed to Plaintiffs and
that these breaches were substan-
tially concurrent in time and of a sim-
ilar nature, they will be entitled to a
shift of a burden of proof on the issue
of causation. Id at 380.
The elements of enterprise liability
are:
(1) Plaintiff is not at fault for his
inability to identify the causative
agent and such liability is due to
the nature of the defendants'
conduct.
(2) A generically similar defective
product was manufactured by all
the defendants.
(3) Plaintiff's injury was caused
by this product defect.
(4) The Defendants owed a duty
to the class of which Plaintiff was
a member.
(5) There is clear and convincing
evidence that Plaintiff's injury
was caused by the product of
some one of the defendants. For
example, the joined defendants
accounted for a high percentage
of such defective products on the
market at the time of Plaintiff's
injury.
(6) There existed an insufficient,
industrywide standard of safety
as to the manufacture of this
product.
(7) All defendants were tortfeas-
ors satisfying the requirements
of whichever cause of action is
proposed: negligence, warranty,
or strict liability.
"Once Plaintiff proves these ele-
ments, the burden of proof as to cau-
sation shifts to Defendants, each of
which can exonerate itself only by
showing, according to the standards
of proof already proposed, that it's
product could not have been the one
which injured this particular Plain-
tiff." Sheiner, at 995.
The above elements sound much
like concert of action and/or alter-
native liability but there are differen-
ces. In enterprise liability, the Plaintiff
need not prove a tacit agreement
which is required in concert of action.
In enterprise liability the concern for
having only a few tortfeasors and the
need to have all before the court is
eliminated. "Enterprise Liability is
derived from alternative liability be-
cause its basic premise is that some
one of the Defendants probably
caused, in the traditional sense, the
Plaintiff's injury. Therefore, any De-
fendant who can show that his pro-
duct could not have caused the injury,
even though he also adhered to inade-
quate industry standards, may excul-
pate himself. Such exculpation would
not be allowed under the concert
approach. (No defendant that partici-
pated in the concerted plan or activity
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is exonerated from liability for its
result.) Enterprise and alternative lia-
bility are also alike because the prim-
ary purpose of both theories is to cure
Plaintiff's inability to identify the in-
jurious product, and both accomplish
this purpose by shifting the burden of
proof of causation to Defendants.
Unlike the theory of alternative
liability, however, enterprise liability
emphasizes certain activities of the
industry as a whole; adherence to an
inadequate safety standard and manu-
facture of an identically defective
product." Sheiner, DES and a Pro-
posed Theory of Enterprise Liability,
46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 966. In
enterprise liability the parallel behav-
ior of the Defendants, absent a tacit
agreement is sufficient.
The Plaintiff must prove an insuf-
ficient industrywide safety standard.
This element of proof was established
in Hall where the court determined
that there existed a "national body of
State Tort Law" and then went on to
establish an industrywide safety
standard.
Many of the decisions in the DES
cases show a definite reluctance to
apply this new doctrine of liability. See,
Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super
551, 570, 420 A.2d 1305, at 1315. Lyons
v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, 107 N.J.
Super 183, 193, 406 A.2d 185, at 190.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132,143,607 P.2d 924, at 935. In
fact, none of the DES cases have sup-
ported a recovery based on enterprise
liability. Nevertheless, it could be
argued successfully as its principles
are well-rooted in traditional strict
liability, products liability, and tort
law rules. Plus, with increasing scien-
tific and technological advancements
there will be more and more cases
involving Plaintiffs who will be un-
able to identify the precise man-
ufacturer of the causative agent.
Enterprise liability is an available
avenue that should be argued because
the policy behind permitting the inno-
cent Plaintiff to recover against neg-
ligent Defendants is or should be
weighted more than the burden of
identifying the precise manufacturer
or causation.
Maud is a feminine name derived
from old high German meaning pow-
erful in battle. MAUDD, pronounced
the same, is an acronym for the
Maryland Advocacy Unit for the De-
velopmentally Disabled, a non-profit
corporation that often does battle to
protect and defend the rights of the
developmentally disabled. Develop-
mentally disabled means a person
who has a severe, chronic disability
which occured before the age of 22, is
likely to continue indefinitely and
results in a substantial limitation to
the person's ability to function nor-
mally in society. See: 49 USCA §6001
(7) (1974) for the federal definition of
developmental disability. Unfortunate-
ly some of MAUDD's power or at
least one of its most important wea-
pons has been weakened by a recent
Supreme Court decision.
The existence of MAUDD is man-
dated by an amendment to the De-
velopmental Disabilities and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 USC §6001-6080
(1974), which requires any state re-
ceiving funds under the Act to provide
an independent agency capable of
protecting and advocating the rights
of persons with developmental dis-
abilities, §49 USCA 6012 (1974). In
the past MAUDD has provided a var-
iety of services for the developmen-
tally disabled, including reviewing
state plans, designing volunteer pro-
grams and acting as a resource and
information center, but foremost is
the service MAUDD has provided as
an advocate in individual cases. In
1980 it handled over 1300 cases
involving the right of the developmen-
tally disabled in the areas of education-
al rights, employment discrimination,
transportation and architectural bar-
riers, guardianship, and the rights of
people within institutions. The task
of MAUDD, already hampered by
budget cuts, has been made even
more difficult by a Supreme Court
decision last spring which unfavorably
interpreted the Developmental Dis-
abilities Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act.
The Court in Pennhurst State School v.
Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981),
reversed the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals which has held that the De-
velopmental Disabilities Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act, 42 USC §6000
(1974) had created substantive rights
in favor of the mentally retarded and
that those rights were judicially en-
forceable. The case was a class action
brought by a minor retarded resident
of Pennhurst State School and Hospi-
tal, and all persons who have been or
may become residents of Pennhurst.
The findings of fact were undisputed:
the conditions at Pennhurst were
dangerous and inhumane, with the
residents often physically abused or
drugged by staff members. The Dis-
trict Court had found that the physi-
cal, intellectual and emotional skills of
some of the residents had actually
deteriorated at Pennhurst.
The plaintiffs claimed there were
various state, federal and constitu-
tional violations including the denial
of rights confirmed by the Develop-
mental Disabilities Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act. In addition to seeking
injunctive and monetary relief, the
plaintiffs urged that Pennhurst be
closed and that community living ar-
rangements-smaller less isolated
residences where retarded people are
treated as much as possible like non-
retarded people-be established for
its residents. The District Court found
for the plaintiffs and ordered that
Pennhurst eventually be closed and,
that individual treatment plans be
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